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ARTICLE
AN EVALUATION OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE
FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
FROM THE FIRST CONGRESS’ DEBATE OVER
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE FIRST
BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
LEE J. STRANG*
I. INTRODUCTION
Originalism, a theory on its last legs in the 1980s,1 gained renewed
vigor in the late 1990s and early 2000s.2 One of the reasons for this re-
newed vigor was the move that many originalists made from original intent
originalism to original meaning originalism. This “New Originalism”3 iden-
tified the Constitution’s meaning as the original public meaning of the Con-
stitution’s text.4
* John W. Stoepler Professor of Law & Values, the University of Toledo College of Law.
Thank you to the University of St. Thomas Law Journal and Professor Charles Reid, Jr. for or-
ganizing and hosting this Symposium, the Symposium participants and audience for their thought-
ful comments and suggestions, and Professor Lawrence Solum for his suggestions on how to
ascertain whether evidence for construction existed. This Essay represents my tentative thoughts
on the subject of historical evidence regarding constitutional construction. I plan to more exten-
sively survey evidence on this subject in future work.
1. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 611
(1999) (“The received wisdom among law professors is that originalism is dead, having been
defeated in intellectual combat sometime in the eighties.”) [hereinafter Barnett, An Originalism
for Nonoriginalists].
2. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599 (2004)
(describing this resurgence).
3. Id.; see also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004); KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JU-
DICIAL REVIEW (1999).
4. Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Mean-
ing, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Solum, The Fixation Thesis].
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Constitutional construction was a concept (re)introduced5 by original-
ists around the same time.6 Constitutional construction is typically de-
scribed by originalists as the activity of crafting constitutional meaning
when the Constitution’s original meaning is underdetermined.7 Within this
“construction zone,” interpreters have discretion on how to create constitu-
tional meaning.8
In this Essay, I review a modest selection of important evidence from
the early Republic, the debate over the constitutionality of the First Bank of
the United States in the First Congress, to evaluate whether, to what extent,
and how Americans utilized constitutional construction in the early Repub-
lic. Though this investigation focused on only a subset of the large quantity
of potential historical evidence, it surveyed an important historical episode
in the early Republic, evidence that any plausible interpretation of the pe-
riod must fit.9
This Essay derives a number of tentative conclusions from this evi-
dence. First, the participants in this early debate appeared to believe that a
necessary precondition for constitutional construction—underdetermi-
nacy10—existed, at least prima facie. Second, the participants also argued
as if, after the application of a number of interpretative rules,11 the Consti-
tution provided a determinate answer to the constitutional question. Third,
5. Originalists who advocate for the existence of construction argue that construction has
existed as a phenomenon as long as the Constitution has existed. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 20–71
(1999) (describing the Chase impeachment as an example of construction) [hereinafter WHITTING-
TON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION] .
6. See WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 5 (providing a book-
length treatment of the concept); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 467–469 (2013) (describing this).
7. WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 9 (“The defining features of constitutional constructions
are that they resolve textual indeterminacies and that they address constructional subject matter.”);
see also JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITU-
TION 139 (2013) (describing construction this way); compare Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative
Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 507–518 (2013) (describing a concep-
tion of construction that occurs for both determined and underdetermined constitutional meaning)
[hereinafter Solum, Communicative Content]; Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construc-
tion, supra note 6, at 469–535 (same); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Dis-
tinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 103–108 (2011) (arguing that construction also includes the
determination of legal effect of determinate constitutional meaning) [hereinafter Solum, The Inter-
pretation-Construction Distinction].
8. WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 6.
9. In other words, the debate over federal power to charter a national bank was so early and
so important an issue debated by such prominent Framers and Ratifiers, that any conception of
constitutional construction must be able to take it into account.
10. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987) [hereinafter Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis].
11. By “interpretative rules” I mean tools utilized by the debate participants to identify (what
they perceived as) the Constitution’s answer to the interpretative question. For instance, the par-
ticipants appealed to the type of government created by the Constitution. By choosing this label, I
am eliding the debate over whether there existed “original methods” that were constitutive of the
original meaning.
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the participants seemed ultimately to conclude that the Constitution’s mean-
ing provided a determinate answer to the question under debate (though
they continued to disagree about what that answer was).
Before proceeding, let me emphasize that my claim is modest because
of the limited evidence I reviewed. At the same time, the debate over the
constitutionality of a nationally chartered bank was one of the most impor-
tant, contentious, and thoroughly debated constitutional issues in the early
Republic, so it is weighty evidence.
In Part II, I briefly describe originalism and constitutional construc-
tion. The heart of this Essay, Part III, derives two conclusions from the
debate: first, the debate participants perceived that the Constitution did not
provide patent answers to the debated constitutional question; and second,
the participants believed that the application of interpretative rules showed
that the Constitution ultimately provided a determinate answer to the ques-
tion. Lastly, in Part IV, I suggest that whether these debates show the exis-
tence of constitutional construction depends on one’s conception of
originalism itself.
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
Originalism’s core is composed of the fixation thesis and the constraint
principle.12 The fixation thesis is the proposition that the Constitution’s
meaning was fixed when it was ratified.13 The constraint principle is the
proposition that the Constitution’s original meaning constrains constitu-
tional law.14
Originalism evolved in response to criticisms of its earlier incarna-
tions, and these criticisms led originalists to articulate the concept of consti-
tutional construction. One such criticism was that original intent originalism
was theoretically impossible or practically too difficult.15 This criticism was
a subset of a more general criticism that the Constitution’s original meaning
does not answer all constitutional questions.16
Many originalists accepted these criticisms and reconceptualized
originalism as original meaning originalism.17 Originalists argued that the
12. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional
Practice (Mar. 24, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2940215 (describing the constraint principle) [hereinafter Solum, The Con-
straint Principle]; see also Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 4, at 1 (describing the fixation
thesis).
13. Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 4, at 1.
14. Solum, The Constraint Principle, supra note 12, at 2.
15. See Lee J. Strang, How Big Data Can Increase Originalism’s Methodological Rigor:
Using Corpus Linguistics to Reveal Original Language Conventions, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1181, 1191 (2017) (identifying this argument).
16. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 216–217, 220, 222 (1980).
17. BARNETT, supra note 3, at 92; WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 88–109.
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Constitution’s public meaning, at the time it was ratified, was a fact-of-the-
world, one that was not only theoretically accessible but also practically
recoverable.18
However, the Constitution’s original meaning is “thinner” than its
original intent,19 and therefore has more frequent instances of un-
derdeterminacy.20 Originalists argued that constitutional construction is the
activity that occurs in these situations of underdeterminacy.21 Thinking
back to the fixation thesis and constraint principle, constitutional construc-
tion is the claim that the constitutional meaning that was fixed at ratification
was insufficiently dense to fully constrain constitutional doctrine.
Currently, originalists debate the existence and characteristics of con-
struction. Two of the most important such issues are the quantity of con-
struction and who has the authority to construct constitutional meaning.22
Most prominently, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport have argued that,
properly understood, originalism likely has little-to-no room for constitu-
tional construction: it is interpretation all the way down.23 They reach this
conclusion through two main moves. First, they argue that, even if the Con-
stitution’s semantic meaning is underdetermined, application of the original
methods eliminates all (or almost all) indeterminacy.24 Second, they argue
that, even if there remained underderminacy after application of these origi-
nal-methods-closure rules, an interpreter should choose that meaning sup-
ported by the most evidence.25
Among those originalists that argue for construction’s existence, there
are a variety of disagreements. For example, they disagree on which gov-
ernment officials have the authority to construct constitutional meaning.
Many originalists argue that the judiciary possesses that authority, and
many others argue that the elected branches have it.26
18. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, supra note 1, at 649–650; WHITTINGTON,
supra note 3, at 88–109.
19. At least absent incorporation of the original methods. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra
note 7, at 116–38, or some other closure rules internal to the original meaning. See Gary Lawson,
Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411, 423–428 (1996)
(arguing that the Constitution prescribes burdens of proof).
20. Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation,
103 NW. U.L. REV. 703, 719–725 (2009); Lee J. Strang, Virtue’s Home in Originalism, 80 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1997, 2008 (2012).
21. See BARNETT, supra note 3, at 118–130; WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 1–19; Solum,
The Fixation Thesis, supra note 4, at 24.
22. See Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 6, at 472–473 (not-
ing these disagreements among originalists).
23. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 7, at 139–153. Though Professors McGinnis and
Rappaport’s arguments are powerful, most originalists currently accept construction’s existence.
24. Id. at 141. They further argue that application of the original methods is a necessary part
of ascertaining the original meaning.
25. Id. at 141–142.
26. Compare WHITTINGTON, supra note 3, at 7, 9, 11 (arguing that construction is a political
and hence non-judicial enterprise), with BARNETT, supra note 3, at 122 (“I do not share Whitting-
ton’s characterization of the process of construction as ‘political.’”). But see Keith E. Whittington,
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Despite the nuances of this intra-originalist debate, all agree that con-
struction, if it exists, includes at least the non-determined creation of consti-
tutional meaning.27 Unlike interpretation, which provides determinate
answers to constitutional questions, construction leaves the questions unan-
swered or, more typically, narrows the universe of possible answers. The
relevant constructor of meaning28 must craft constitutional meaning that is
consistent with the known original meaning.
Professor Lawrence Solum, who has been the most sophisticated and
prolific scholar in this area, has recently clarified his conception of con-
struction. He argued that constitutional construction is giving legal effect to
constitutional meaning.29 This occurs both when the Constitution’s original
meaning is determinate and when it is underdetermined. For instance, the
Supreme Court ruled in District of Columbia v. Heller, that the original
meaning of the Second Amendment was that it protected an individual right
to keep and bear arms for self-defense.30 The Court applied the Second
Amendment to the District of Columbia’s gun control restrictions and ruled
that it had the legal effect of determining that an ordinance that banned the
possession of a handgun in the home violated the Second Amendment.31
This legal meaning is different from the Amendment’s original meaning,
Professor Solum would argue, even if the Amendment’s original meaning
determined Heller’s outcome. Under Professor Solum’s view, construction
occurs both when the original meaning determines a case and when it un-
derdetermines a case.
There appears, therefore, to be an originalist consensus on (at least)
one major point—that construction occurs (at least) when the original
meaning underdetermines a case—and this point of agreement fits the ini-
Constructing a New American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 125–129 (2010) (modify-
ing his previous position and concluding that, “[s]o long as judges are acting as faithful agents to
provisionally maintain constitutional understandings widely shared by other political actors, then
their role in articulating constitutional constructions may not be objectionable.”). See also Lee J.
Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism: Theoretical Possibilities and Practical Differ-
ences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 272–274 (2011) (describing where various originalists fall
on this issue).
27. The most important recent intervention into this debate is Randy E. Barnett & Evan
Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism (Jan. 17, 2018) (unpublished
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3049056. Professors Barnett
and Bernick likewise identify (at least a facet of) construction with underdetermined constitutional
meaning. See id. at 1 (“Therefore, when interpretation of original meaning is not sufficient to
resolve a controversy, judges have a duty of good-faith originalist construction.”).
28. The relevant constructor of constitutional meaning may be Congress, the president, the
Supreme Court, and/or state officials, depending on one’s conception of originalism.
29. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, supra note 7, at 507–518; Solum,
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 6, at 469–535; Solum, The Interpreta-
tion-Construction Distinction, supra note 7, at 103–108 (arguing that construction also includes
the determination of legal effect of determinate constitutional meaning).
30. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 647 (2008) (“[T]he individual right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation”).
31. Id. at 635.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST105.txt unknown Seq: 6 16-APR-18 8:01
198 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
tial reasons originalists articulated the concept of construction, which I ear-
lier described. Construction is the originalist acknowledgement that the
original meaning “runs out,” and that interpreters have discretion on how
they construe constitutional meaning (when the meaning is
underdetermined).
There is a lot at stake in the debate over the existence and scope of
construction. I will note three implications. First, construction can dramati-
cally affect the quantity of the Constitution’s answers to important constitu-
tional questions. The greater the scope of construction, the fewer
determinate answers the Constitution provides. This profoundly affects the
Constitution’s ability to guide government officers and Americans gener-
ally. For instance, if the Interstate Commerce Clause is underdetermined on
the point of whether, and to what extent, states may not affect interstate
commerce in the absence of congressional action, then state officials and
federal judges lack important guidance.
Second, and relatedly, construction affects the scope of federal power
and constitutional rights. The greater the scope of construction then, de-
pending on one’s conception of construction, there is a greater or lesser
federal power and constitutionally protected rights. For instance, if one’s
conception of construction includes a “presumption of liberty,”32 then an
underdetermined Commerce Clause is constructed to mean that Congress
does not have power; on the contrary, if one’s conception of construction
includes a “presumption of authority,” then Congress could construct its
commerce power relatively more capaciously.33
Third, construction affects the relative power of the judiciary and the
other federal branches and the states. The greater the scope of construction
then, depending on one’s conception of construction, the elected or judicial
branches may possess relatively greater authority. If one’s conception of
construction includes federal court primacy in the construction zone, then
federal courts are relatively more powerful; if one’s conception of construc-
tion includes elected branch and state authority in the construction zone,
then the federal courts are relatively less powerful.
Though originalists debate whether construction exists and its con-
tours, they agree that, if it exists, it is the result of the Constitution’s mean-
ing’s underdeterminacy.34 Taking this point of consensus as the focus of my
investigation, I evaluate below whether the participants in the debate over
the constitutionality of federally chartering the First Bank of the United
States possessed and utilized the concept—not the label—of construction. I
do so by reviewing the prominent debate over the constitutionality of the
32. BARNETT, supra note 3, at 253–273.
33. See Lee J. Strang, The Role of the Common Good in Legal and Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 48, 70–72 (2005).
34. Since Professor Solum’s conception of construction includes underdeterminacy as part of
construction, my claim applies to it as well.
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national bank in the early Republic to ascertain whether the participants
perceived the Constitution’s meaning as underdetermined and, if so, how
they responded.
III. THE FIRST CONGRESS’ DEBATE OVER THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
THE FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED STATES SUGGESTS THAT THE DEBATE
PARTICIPANTS BELIEVED THAT THE CONSTITUTION’S MEANING WAS PRIMA
FACIE UNDERDETERMINED; IT ALSO SHOWED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS
BELIEVED THAT THE CONSTITUTION’S MEANING WAS SUFFICIENTLY
CLEAR AFTER THE APPLICATION OF RULES OF INTERPRETATION
A. A Sample of an Important Debate in the Early Republic Over the
Constitution’s Meaning
In this Part, I review a sampling of one of the most prominent debates
over the Constitution’s meaning in the early Republic. I selected this debate
for three primary reasons. First, it involved a robust debate over constitu-
tional meaning. This debate was a contest between plausible alternative
constitutional meanings. When more than one plausible constitutional
meaning exists, that phenomenon suggests at least the possibility of consti-
tutional underdeterminacy.
Second, the debate leaders’ experience and expertise suggests that the
debate included the best available arguments. The debate was led by the
Constitution’s leading Framers and Ratifiers, including James Madison and
Alexander Hamilton in the House,35 and Oliver Ellsworth and George
Washington in the broader debate. They were well educated, many were
attorneys, and they possessed intimate knowledge of the Constitution, and
so could present reasonable arguments. Many of the debate leaders, like
James Madison, were skilled in the craft of legal and constitutional interpre-
tation, so they were adept at identifying constitutional underdeterminacy, if
it existed.
Third, this debate was over an important constitutional issue; indeed,
one of the most pressing political issues of the day. This issue’s importance
incentivized advocates on both sides to present arguments that the Constitu-
tion supported their respective interpretations, and that clearly happened in
this debate. One would also expect that the stakes of these issues would
incentivize the debate participants to identify constitutional un-
derdeterminacy, if it existed, to support their respective positions.
35. Hamilton participated in the House debates in the form of his Report recommending that
Congress charter a national bank.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\14-1\UST105.txt unknown Seq: 8 16-APR-18 8:01
200 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 14:1
B. Congressional Debate over Constitutionality of the First National
Bank of the United States Reveals an Awareness by Debate
Participants of Prima Facie Constitutional Underdeterminacy and
that the Constitution Ultimately Provided a Determinate Answer to
the Constitutional Question
The most important debate in the early Republic over the Constitu-
tion’s meaning was over whether Congress possessed the power to charter a
national bank. Chartering a national bank was important for a host of rea-
sons. Economically, a national bank would significantly impact the Ameri-
can economy.36 Politically, a national bank would be an important
participant in the nation’s political life.37 Culturally, a national bank had the
potential to push the fledgling United States away from agrarianism toward
a commercial republic. Legally, chartering a national bank required a capa-
cious interpretation of Congress’ powers, one with precedent-setting weight
on the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the constitutional
principle of limited and enumerated powers. The debate participants recog-
nized these high stakes.
The debate over the constitutionality of a federally chartered national
bank continued over nearly three decades in the early Republic. I focus my
investigation on the initial debate in the House of Representatives. This
initial debate began when Secretary of the Treasury Hamilton introduced
his Report on a National Bank on December 14, 1790,38 the debate oc-
curred in the House in early 1791,39 and the debate continued in the Wash-
ington Administration as President Washington deliberated on whether to
sign the Act.40 The debate concerned whether Congress possessed the au-
thority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to charter a national bank.
The House ultimately decided to charter the bank, and Congress passed the
Act on February 25, 1791.41
This debate provides evidence of two conclusions: first, the debate par-
ticipants believed that, at first blush, the Constitution’s meaning was not
patent; and second, the debate participants believed that the Constitution
provided a determinate answer following a series of arguments drawing out
36. Though supporters and opponents disagreed on what those impacts would be and whether
they would be beneficial.
37. Though, again, supporters and opponents disagreed on what forms that participation
would take and whether it was positive.
38. Alexander Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, Communicated to the House of Repre-
sentatives, Dec. 14, 1790, reprinted in 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 2031–2059 (1791).
39. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1940 (1791).
40. See generally LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED
STATES 2–114 (Matthew St. Clair Clarke & David A. Hall eds., 1832) (providing the basic docu-
ments for this debate).
41. An Act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191
(1791).
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the Constitution’s meaning. Below, I describe the evidence supporting each
proposition in turn.
1. The Debate Participants Appeared to Believe that, at First
Blush, the Constitution’s Meaning was Underdetermined
The participants appeared to acknowledge that the question was not
open-and-shut; they did not appear to believe that arguments were unneces-
sary to establish the accuracy of their interpretation, nor did they appear to
believe that their opponents’ arguments were patently false or frivolous.
Opposing the Bank’s constitutionality, James Madison acknowledged that
the Constitution was not completely perspicacious because that “is not the
character of any human work, particularly the work of a body of men.”42 He
argued that “[w]here a meaning is clear, the consequences, whatever they
may be, are to be admitted—where doubtful, it is fairly triable by its conse-
quences.”43 He then went on to catalogue the inadmissible negative conse-
quences of the opposing view.44 He identified the enumerated powers under
which Bank supporters found such power as “[t]he only clauses under
which such a power could be pretended are . . . .”45 Madison also acknowl-
edged at the end of his speech in the House that “[i]f the point be doubtful
only . . . .”46
The debate participants treated the subject of debate as legitimately
open to debate. They heartily joined the debate. For example, Jeremiah
Smith used “the principles advanced by Mr. Madison, in the debate on the
power of removability” to argue for a congressional power to charter the
national bank.47 The debates were sometimes heated and even personal.
Theodore Sedgwick, for instance, suggested that James Madison’s argu-
ment against the implied power to incorporate the national bank was incon-
sistent with his earlier support of the President’s implied power to remove
federal officers.48
The debate participants did not argue that the Constitution’s text pa-
tently determined the issue. In fact, they often acknowledged the opposite.
For example, Fisher Ames explicitly acknowledged that the issue was not
patently clear because he “had noticed the great marks by which the con-
struction of the Constitution . . . must be guided . . .; and these, if not
absolutely certain, were very far from being arbitrary or unsafe.”49 Ames
explained earlier, in the same lengthy speech to the House, why this oc-
42. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1949 (1791).
43. Id. at 1946.
44. Id. at 1946–1949.
45. Id. at 1946.
46. Id. at 1951–1952.
47. Id. at 1980.
48. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1960 (1791).
49. Id. at 1958.
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curred: “the ingenuity of man was unequal to providing, especially before-
hand, for all the contingencies that would happen.”50
House members expressly tied the need for reasoned interpretation to
this prima facie opacity. Representative Theodore Sedgwick stated that the
House, “in his opinion, indispensably must construe the powers which had
been granted to them.”51 Similarly, Elias Boudinot stated that “[w]hatever
power is exercised by Congress must be drawn from the Constitution; either
from the express words or apparent meaning, or from a necessary
implication.”52
The debate participants also identified reasons for the Constitution’s
lack of full clarity on the debated constitutional issue. James Madison ac-
knowledged that “[i]t is not pretended that every insertion or omission in
the Constitution is the effect of systematic attention. This is not the charac-
ter of any human work, particularly the work of a body of men.”53 Support-
ing the Bank’s constitutionality, Fisher Ames identified a cause of
reasonable disagreement over the Constitution’s meaning. He said
that the ingenuity of man was unequal to providing, especially
beforehand, for all the contingencies that would happen. The
Constitution contains the principles which are to govern in mak-
ing laws; but every law requires an application of the rule to the
case in question. We may err in applying it; but we are to exercise
our judgments, and on every occasion to decide according to an
honest conviction of its true meaning.54
Theodore Sedgwick noted that “probably no instrument for the delegation
of power could be drawn with such precision and accuracy as to leave noth-
ing to necessary implication.”55
The participants also identified “rules” of interpretation, as James
Madison called them,56 prior to applying them. This showed that the par-
ticipants believed that rules of interpretation were needed to elucidate con-
stitutional meaning. After describing the practical “advantages” and
“disadvantages” of a national bank,57 Madison identified the “rules” of in-
terpretation “[a]s preliminaries to a right interpretation.”58 It was only after
the rules’ application that Madison was able to identify the Constitution’s
answer to the question before the House.59 Elias Boudinot began his argu-
ment for his interpretation of the Constitution by first noting that the Con-
50. Id. at 1954.
51. Id. at 1961.
52. Id. at 1970.
53. Id. at 1949.
54. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1954 (1791).
55. Id. at 1960.
56. Id. at 1944.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1945 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 1945–1946.
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stitution’s text was not always clear, and he likewise identified his rules of
interpretation.60
One of the commonly identified rules of interpretation was: “[w]here a
meaning is clear, the consequences . . . are to be admitted—where doubtful,
it is fairly triable by its consequences.”61 Many of the debate participants
relied on the good or bad consequences of the proposed interpretations to
“try” the issue. For example, according to James Madison, the capacious
interpretation of federal power necessary to authorize Congress to charter a
national bank would have the bad consequence of destroying the federal
government’s character as one of limited and enumerated powers.62 This
shows that the participants believed that the Constitution’s meaning was
initially “doubtful.”
2. The Debate Participants Appeared to Believe that the
Constitution Provided Determinate Answers Following
Application of Rules of Interpretation
The debate participants did not give up or stop working to extract
meaning from the Constitution to answer the issue before them, despite
(what they perceived as) the Constitution’s prima facie lack of clarity. Ad-
ditionally, none seemed to believe that the Constitution failed to answer the
question. Nor did the participants argue that the proposed bank’s normative
attractiveness, or lack thereof, was itself sufficient reason to conclude that
Congress possessed the power to charter it or lacked the power to do so.
Instead, the participants worked hard to wring meaning from the Constitu-
tion until they found that it answered the question.
To do so, the debate participants employed what they called “rules” of
interpretation. They utilized these rules to make patent the Constitution’s
otherwise-opaque meaning. Fisher Ames, for example, noted in his speech
that, “[i]f, therefore, some interpretation of the Constitution must be in-
dulged, by what rules is it to be governed?”63 John Lawrence,64 from New
York, analogized the debate over incorporation to the earlier House debate
on the President’s removal power. He acknowledged that, regarding “con-
structions . . . it was necessary to be lamented that they should ever be
necessary; but they have been made.”65
The debate participants applied these rules of interpretation to arrive at
what they perceived as determinate answers to the question of constitutional
meaning. For instance, James Madison stated that, by following the “rules”
60. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1970 (1791).
61. Id. at 1946 (statement of James Madison).
62. Id. at 1947.
63. Id. at 1955.
64. Congressman Lawrence’s name was also spelled “Laurance.”
65. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1966 (1791).
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of interpretation, he would arrive at the “right interpretation”66: “Reviewing
the Constitution with an eye to these positions [rules of interpretation], it is
not possible to discover in it the power to incorporate a Bank.”67 Following
a lengthy speech, Fisher Ames concluded: “In proving that Congress may
exercise powers which are not expressly granted by the Constitution, he had
endeavored to establish such rules of interpretation, and had illustrated his
ideas by such observations as would anticipate . . . the application of his
principles to the point in question.”68 Concretely, Representative Lawrence
applied the rule of absurdity in favor of finding a power to incorporate the
national bank and stated that “[t]o suppose that this Government does not
possess the powers for which the Constitution was adopted involves the
grossest absurdity.”69 Elias Boudinot, after an exhaustive review of argu-
ments and counter-arguments concluded:
Upon the whole, then, . . . that on taking the power in question in
every point of view, and giving the Constitution the fullest con-
sideration, under the advantage of having the objections placed in
the strongest point of light by the great abilities of the gentlemen
in the opposition, he was clearly in favor of the bill; . . . and
unless more conclusive arguments could be adduced to show its
unconstitutionality, he should in the end vote for the passing of
the bill.70
Likewise, after (exhaustive) application of his many arguments, James
Madison’s own summary of his argument suggested that he believed that
the Constitution determinatively answered the constitutional question:
It appeared on the whole . . . that the power exercised by the bill
was condemned by the silence of the Constitution; was con-
demned by the rule of interpretation arising out of the Constitu-
tion; was condemned by its tendency to destroy the main
characteristic of the Constitution; was condemned by the exposi-
tion of the friends of the Constitution, whilst depending before the
public; was condemned by the apparent intention of the parties
which ratified the Constitution; was condemned by the explana-
tory amendments proposed by Congress themselves to the Consti-
tution; and he hoped it would receive its final condemnation by
the vote of this House.71
By their vote, a majority of his colleagues appeared to believe that the
Constitution held otherwise.
66. Id. at 1945.
67. Id. at 1946.
68. Id. at 1958.
69. Id. at 1965.
70. Id. at 1979.
71. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1952 (1791).
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IV. THIS EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THREE ADDITIONAL POSSIBILITIES
REGARDING CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
Let me close by suggesting that this evidence from the debate over the
constitutionality of the national bank suggests three further possibilities:
first, it suggests that, whether construction exists depends on one’s under-
standing of the existence and role of rules of interpretation; second, there
may be a way to synthesize at least some of the disparate conceptions of
construction; and third, it may suggest that the category of constitutional
construction is an empty set.
First, this evidence makes more likely the possibility that, whether
constitutional construction exists, depends on whether one’s conception of
the original meaning includes as a constitutive facet of the original meaning
itself the original methods of interpretation. If the original meaning includes
the meaning that results from application of the original rules of interpreta-
tion, then this debate suggests that construction72 does not exist. By con-
trast, if one’s conception of the original meaning treats rules of
interpretation like those utilized by the debate participants as extrinsic to the
original meaning, then their use in the debates is evidence of the original
meaning’s underdeterminacy.
This is not a new contribution. What is new is that the surveyed debate
seems to provide evidence that could be understood as supporting either
conception. The debate participants appeared to believe they arrived at de-
terminate answers, but only after application of rules of interpretation. This
could show that the Constitution’s meaning was underdetermined; it could
also show that the meaning was determinate. It depends on whether the
applied rules of interpretation were constitutive of the original meaning or
extrinsic to it.
Second, and relatedly, this evidence suggests a way to synthesize at
least some facets of the disparate originalist conceptions of constitutional
construction. The evidence I surveyed contains two different and yet related
characteristics: (1) the participants appeared to believe that the Constitu-
tion’s meaning did not clearly answer the constitutional question; and (2)
the participants appeared to believe that, after application of sufficient inter-
pretative argumentation, the Constitution’s meaning did answer the ques-
tion. These characteristics suggest that, on the one hand, the conception of
construction that identifies construction as a zone of constitutional un-
derdeterminacy is accurate. On the other hand, the conception of construc-
tion that identifies a thick interpretative practice as part of the
Constitution’s original meaning and which (at least) reduces constitutional
underdeterminacy and (at most) eliminates underdeterminacy is also
accurate.
72. Construction as defined to include only those situations of constitutional
underdeterminacy.
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The debate over the constitutionality of the national bank tends to
show that constitutional construction exists only as initial and epistemic
indeterminacy.73 The evidence I reviewed suggests that the debate partici-
pants proceeded on the premise that the Constitution did not prima facie
answer the question at issue. They believed that the Constitution did not
obviously answer the question of whether Congress could charter a national
bank.
However, this is not sufficient evidence of construction, at least if un-
derstood as requiring constitutional underdeterminacy (which is the conven-
tional originalist understanding). This is because the debate participants
seemed to believe that the Constitution ultimately did answer the ques-
tion—that the Constitution was not underdeterminate—on this question, af-
ter the application of rules of interpretation, which the participants believed
also provided evidence of the Constitution’s meaning.
Third, this evidence may show that constitutional construction is an
empty set. The evidence I reviewed suggests that the debate participants
believed that the Constitution’s meaning determinatively answered the
questions at issue after application of the rules of interpretation. Therefore,
the precondition to construction—underdeterminacy—did not exist.
V. CONCLUSION
In this brief Essay, I made three moves. First, I briefly described con-
stitutional construction. Second, I reviewed the evidence of the House de-
bate over the constitutionality of the bill to charter the First Bank of the
United States. From this debate I drew two tentative conclusions: (1) the
debate participants believed that, at first blush, the Constitution’s meaning
was not patent; and (2), the debate participants believed that the Constitu-
tion provided determinate answers following a series of arguments drawing
out the Constitution’s meaning. Third, I suggested three further implications
for the current originalist debate over constitutional construction.
73. See Ken Kress, A Preface to Epistemological Indeterminacy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 134
(1990) (describing the concept of epistemic indeterminacy); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory
of Precedent: The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1729,
1758–1762 (2010) (leveraging this concept in the contexts of constitutional construction and
precedent).
